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Army camouflage: You can’t kill what you can’t see  
 
 
Current Situation, Spring 2014 
 
Colonel Bob Smith, the Army Project Manager (PM) responsible for uniforms, felt 
uneasy as he prepared for meetings in the Pentagon with Army senior leaders regarding the 
final decision on the camouflage pattern for combat uniforms. He had been down this road for 
the previous two years—each time the Army delayed the decision. The Army postponed the 
decision on the camouflage pattern for a variety of reasons to include testing gaps, contract 
issues, intellectual property challenges, National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) concerns, 
as well as affordability and implementation issues. Although Colonel Smith felt uneasy, he was 
also confident that his team had addressed all stakeholder concerns and followed the guidance 
provided by the senior leadership. The urgency to change the camouflage patterns on combat 
uniforms remained an Army top priority, and he remained committed to getting a decision.  
Background 
 The protection of American soldiers in combat was a top priority for senior leaders in 
the U.S. Army. Camouflage on combat uniforms offered individual soldiers concealment on the 
battlefield, which contributed to increasing mission effectiveness and better protection. In 
Afghanistan, for example, Army soldiers faced diverse battlefield operating environments in 
combat operations (see Figure 1). During a single mission, soldiers faced many different terrains 
across various environmental backgrounds. Each of these environmental backgrounds 
contained different earth-tone colors, which required different matching earth-tone colors in 
the combat uniform to effectively conceal a soldier from detection and/or observation. Soldiers 
who wore combat uniforms and equipment with the universal camouflage pattern (UCP), a 
three-color digital pattern adopted by the Army in 2005, did not effectively blend into the 
diverse backgrounds typical during combat missions. The UCP colors were not earth-tone and 
were generally too bright—making soldiers easy to detect and providing ineffective 
concealment. 
From 2005 after the adoption of the Army combat uniform (ACU) with UCP until 2009, 
the Army received overwhelmingly negative feedback from soldiers in Afghanistan about the 
suitability of UCP for the diverse Afghan backgrounds and environments. As a result, in the 
2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Congress directed the Army to take action to provide 
effective camouflage for personnel deployed to Afghanistan. In September 2009, the Army 
submitted a Report to Congress on Combat Uniform Camouflage that outlined a four-phased 
approach: Phase I Immediate Action, Phase II Build the Science, Phase III OEF Specific 
Camouflage, and Phase IV Army Combat Uniform Decision for a Long-Term Multi-Environment 
Camouflage.  (Refer to Exhibit 1 for a summary of the results of the Army’s four-phased 







The Army recognized that advancing the science of combat uniform camouflage testing 
was vitally important to enabling data-driven decisions on the most effective camouflage 
pattern. It acknowledged that it was unaffordable to field-test various camouflage patterns in 
every possible environment and background. To gain a statistically robust data set to support 
decision-making, the Army developed a test and evaluation strategy that involved technical 
testing referred to as photo simulation for pattern selection and operational field-testing with 
soldiers for pattern performance confirmation and operational insights. (Refer to Exhibit 2 for a 
more detailed explanation of combat uniform testing basics.) 
The Army completed Phase III and decided to give soldiers deploying to Afghanistan 
flame-resistant uniforms in the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) camouflage pattern (OEF 
CP). The Phase IV decision on the camouflage pattern best for the entire Army on all uniforms 
and equipment had much wider implications, ranging from affordability concerns to 
implementation challenges.  (Refer to Exhibit 3 for a basic overview of Army camouflaged 
uniforms and equipment.)  Figure 2 displays a pictorial representation of the uniforms soldiers 
would typically wore in the spring of 2014 at the time the Army was trying to make a 
camouflage decision. Soldiers wore the ACU with UCP in most regions, except in the Middle 
East. Soldiers wore the flame resistant ACU (or FRACU) with UCP when deployed to combat 
operations in Iraq and Kuwait, while soldiers supporting combat operations in OEF wore the 
FRACU in OEF CP. 
 For the long-term Phase IV effort, the Army remained committed to adopting a family of 
three camouflage patterns—one suited for operations in desert/arid environments, one suited 
for operations in woodland/jungle environments, and a transitional pattern suited for all other 
environments. The transitional pattern was also the camouflage on the uniforms soldiers wore 
in daily, non-combat, garrison operations. This decision affected not just soldiers deploying to 
combat operations, but all active duty, reserve duty and National Guard soldiers numbering 
approximating 1 million total soldiers.   
 Twice the Army made a decision on this transitional camouflage pattern change away 
from UCP, and both times issues arose that stopped the implementation. In the spring of 2013, 
the Army’s decision to adopt a Phase IV vendor’s transitional pattern was delayed due to 
concerns about language in the draft FY14 NDAA and contract protest risks. Subsequently, the 
Army changed strategies in the summer 2013, and tried to adopt OEF CP as the Army’s 
transitional pattern on uniforms across the Army. However, contract negotiations with Crye 
Precision LLC, the vendor that owned the rights to OEF CP, commercially known as MultiCam©, 
stalled over affordability concerns. Crye offered OEF CP to the Army for a lump sum payment of 
$24M or a 1% royalty on all camouflaged uniforms and equipment.  
Army Guidance, Winter 2013 
 
 In December 2013, the President signed into law the FY14 NDAA. As anticipated from 
the language in the early draft versions, the FY14 NDAA severely restricted the number of 
camouflage patterns across the Armed Services. The Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps 






camouflage patterns unless all the Services agreed to change. The final NDAA made the 
concerns of the Army from the previous spring a reality. The Army’s strategy to delay the 
camouflage decision was a good one.           
Following a series of meetings in the Pentagon with Army senior leaders, the chief of 
staff of the Army issued the following guidance: delay any immediate decision, ensure all 
options for the Army moving forward were rigorously tested, ensure the options considered 
met the intent of the NDAA by meeting with the congressional professional staff members, and 
provide regular updates to the Secretary of the Army. The Secretary of the Army subsequently 
approved the testing of transitional pattern alternatives for March 2014 with an anticipated 
decision in April 2014 pending successful and positive testing results (see Figure 3). 
Program Implementation, Spring 2014 
 
Colonel Smith led his team to execute yet another revised strategy for combat uniform 
camouflage testing. The intent of the new strategy was to consider alternatives to OEF CP that 
provided equivalent or better performance, were affordable/fiscally responsible to implement, 
and were in compliance with the FY14 NDAA. The testing included three baseline reference 
patterns [UCP, Marine Corps pattern (MARPAT) Woodland, and MARPAT Desert], OEF CP, and 
viable OEF CP alternatives. These alternatives were the ScorpionW2 pattern and two digital 
transitional camouflage patterns (referred to as DTC1 and DTC2—patterns based on MARPAT 
but with four earth-tone based colors; see Figure 4). The Army had a series of meetings with 
congressional members who sponsored the NDAA legislation and professional staff members 
who wrote the actual language to ensure the patterns considered were within the intent of the 
law. Congressional leaders considered the DTC1 and DTC2 patterns in a “gray area” of the new 
restrictions and were noncommittal if these patterns met the intent of the law. Nevertheless, 
the Army decided to test these patterns along with the other patterns. 
 In April 2014, the Army tested alternative transitional patterns at Fort Benning in 
operational field tests with U.S. Army Sniper School cadre and in photosimulation assessments 
using soldiers from the 75th Ranger Regiment (testing results presented in Figures 5 and 6). The 
testing to support an Army decision was rigorous and met the intent of the Army Chief of Staff. 
The testing involved sniper experts to assess the operational relevance of the patterns in field 
tests and 106 soldiers as observers of the patterns in 46 separate backgrounds in photo 
simulation evaluations—collecting 19,474 data points. 
From the results shown in Figures 5 and 6, the Army came to the following conclusions: 
UCP performed poorly in all backgrounds (confirming prior results); OEF CP, ScorpionW2, DTC1, 
and DTC2 scored similarly across all background types; MARPAT woodland performed well in 
woodland dormant backgrounds; and MARPAT desert performed well in arid environments. 
The results confirmed that there was a “tight shot” group for the effectiveness and 
performance of the transitional patterns. The Army decision criteria would come down to other 
considerations like affordability/cost, implementation and execution ease, schedule, 
contracting challenges, and intellectual property rights concerns (potential patent, trademark, 






Colonel Smith assembled his team to consider the following options for Chief of Staff 
and Secretary of the Army to consider: 
• Option 1: Do nothing. Make no decision at this time and continue the current 
situation of issuing Soldiers UCP uniforms and equipment for all missions, except in 
Afghanistan where they would continue to get OEF CP uniforms and equipment. 
• Option 2: Select OEF CP, accept the vendor’s terms, and expand its use beyond 
Afghanistan to being the standard pattern of all Army uniforms and equipment. 
• Option 3: Select ScorpionW2 and replace UCP uniforms and equipment over time 
when they wore out. 
• Option 4: Select a digital transitional camouflage (DTC1 or DTC2) and replace UCP 
uniforms and equipment over time when they wore out. 
His team considered these options the main courses of action for Army senior leaders to 
consider. The team debated the following decision criteria to apply to these options: 
performance, schedule, affordability/cost, legal risk, and the perspectives of key stakeholders 
such as soldiers, Congress, the Marine Corps, and the media. 
 As Colonel Smith prepared for the decision meetings, he did not relish the thought of 
going back into the lion’s den again with Army senior leaders in the Pentagon. This would be 
the third time he attempted to get a decision on camouflage for Army uniforms and equipment. 
However, he knew that the decision was of utmost importance for soldiers in combat. Effective 
camouflage increased soldier combat effectiveness and improved force protection—saving 
soldiers’ lives in battle. Colonel Smith thought about the decision in terms of return of 
investment (ROI). From 2009 to 2014 (over six years), the Army spent slightly less than $10 
million in the research, development, and testing of camouflage patterns, but a camouflage 
change would affect the purchase of $5.2 billion of uniforms and equipment over the next 5–10 
years. Colonel Smith considered the research, development, and testing of camouflage patterns 
a wise investment for soldiers and for the American taxpayer. 
The key stakeholders knew the challenges or barriers to a decision. Despite the 
importance of combat uniform camouflage, efforts to change camouflage faced the challenges 
that all programs face: a complex, bureaucratic defense acquisition institution (refer to Exhibit 4 
for a description of the defense acquisition institution). Any decision to change Army 
camouflage crossed multiple chains of command with different decision-makers because it 
affected both uniforms and equipment. The Chief of Staff of the Army approved uniform 
changes after an approval recommendation from the Army Uniform Board. But each piece of 
camouflaged equipment (e.g., cold weather clothing, rucksacks, ballistic vests, helmet covers) 
had a different program decision-maker—either a program executive officer or the Army 
Acquisition Executive. Colonel Smith labored over how to pull together this information into a 
decision and what recommendation he would make when invariably asked by Army senior 
leaders for a specific recommendation. 






• Was the revised strategy executed in accordance with Army guidance and could the 
Army make an informed decision? 
• Were the options considered the only options or were there other viable options? 
• How did the results of the testing affect the Army decision? 
• How did the source of funding (contingency funds or base budget funds) affect the 
decision for the Army? 
• What were the affordability considerations for the Army in this decision? 
• What were the important contractual and legal considerations in this decision? 
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Figure 1. Diverse Battlefield Operating Environments 
 
 



















Figure 5. Operational Field Test Results 
 






Exhibit 1.  Recent History of Army Combat Camouflage Uniforms 
 Figure 7 presents a brief recent history of Army combat uniforms since the adoption of 
the Army Combat Uniform (ACU) with the Universal Camouflage Pattern (UCP). In 2005, the 
Army adopted the ACU to replace the Battle Dress Uniform with the woodland camouflage 
pattern and Desert Camouflage Uniform with the desert camouflage pattern. The ACU was 
produced with the UCP—a three-color (urban gray, desert sand, and foliage green) digital 
pattern. The Army wanted a single combat uniform design with a single camouflage pattern. 
The Army’s decision to adopt a digital pattern (UCP) was influenced by the success of the U.S. 
Marine Corps digital patterns—MARPAT Woodland and MARPAT Desert. Ultimately, in testing, 
UCP provided better or equal concealment than other patterns in urban and desert terrains—





Camouflage Uniform Timeline 
In the 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Congress directed the Army to take 
immediate action to provide effective camouflage for personnel deployed to Afghanistan. In 
September 2009, the Army submitted a Report to Congress on Combat Uniform Camouflage 
that outlined a four-phased approach: Phase I Immediate Action, Phase II Build the Science, 
Phase III OEF Specific Camouflage, and Phase IV Army Combat Uniform Decision for a Long 
Term Multi-Environment Camouflage. 
In November 2009, the Army completed Phase I by fielding two Army battalions 
(approximately 2,000 soldiers) with uniforms in two different patterns. One camouflage pattern 
was Universal Camouflage Pattern-D (UCP-D)—a variant of UCP with coyote brown color added 
and less sand color. The other pattern was a commercial camouflage called MultiCam© 






Special Forces in Afghanistan—was a variation of the original Scorpion pattern considered by 
the Army earlier in the UCP decision. 
 In February 2010, initiating Phase III, the Army selected MultiCam© as the pattern to be 
used on the Fire Resistant ACU (FRACU) and Organization Clothing and Individual Equipment 
(OCIE) for deploying Soldiers to Afghanistan. The Army named the commercially available 
MultiCam© pattern as the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Camouflage Pattern (OEF CP). 
Due to private licensing agreements that resulted in licensing fees embedded in uniform costs, 
the Army paid about a 10% premium on every OEF CP camouflaged uniform or piece of 
equipment compared to UCP uniforms and equipment. 
 In December 2010, the Army outlined an 18-month Phase IV effort for the Army’s 
selection of camouflage to be effective in desert/arid, transitional, and woodland/jungle 
environments. The objective of Phase IV was to develop a “family” of three uniform camouflage 
patterns with a single coordinated pattern for OCIE to provide effective concealment in 
woodland/jungle, transitional, and desert/arid environments. Five families of patterns (four 
commercial vendors and one government submission by the Natick Research, Development & 
Engineering Center) performed as well as or better than the legacy family of patterns. The four 
down-selected vendors included Crye Precision LLC, Kryptek Inc., Atlantic Diving Supply (ADS) 
Inc., and Brookwood Companies Inc. It is noteworthy that three patterns were visually similar in 
appearance: OEF CP (a baseline pattern), the transitional pattern proposed by Crye, and the 
transitional pattern submitted by NSRDEC named ScorpionW2. Each of these patterns was 
developed, changed, and optimized independently from the same base pattern called 
Scorpion—a pattern developed by Crye in the early 2000s under contract with the U.S. Army 
(see Figure 8 for a description of the relationships and differences between the Scorpion, 
MultiCam© (OEF CP), Phase IV Crye transitional, and ScorpionW2 camouflage patterns). All 
three patterns performed similarly in testing which served as a built-in, internal verification of 
the validity of the testing. 
 
Figure 8. 






In January 2012, the Army awarded Phase IV contracts to the four down-selected 
vendors. The contracts included contract options to procure the non-exclusive license rights for 
each of the proposed camouflage patterns. The competitive range to buy the license rights 
from the four vendors for a single camouflage pattern ranged from $25,000 to $2.1 million. 
Crye offered the set of patterns for $600,000 ($200,000 each for three patterns—woodland, 
desert, and transitional/OCIE).  Each vendor signed a non-exclusive license agreement which 
provided the Army the option to obtain (for a single lump sum) the rights to use the material 
for the production of patterns for printing on an unlimited number of uniforms, individual 
equipment, and unit level equipment for U.S. government purposes (e.g., Army, Navy, Marine 
Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard, including their active and reserve components) excepting 
foreign military sales with successive renewable 10-year periods.  
From July 2012 to March 2013, the Army conducted extensive uniform camouflage 
testing. The 12 commercial vendors’ patterns (each of the four vendors had a woodland, 
transitional, and desert pattern along with a matching transitional OCIE pattern) and six 
reference patterns (UCP, OEF CP, MARPAT-W, MARPAT-D, and Navy patterns) were printed on 
fabric, and the fabric was assembled into uniforms and OCIE. The results of this extensive 
testing showed that all the vendor patterns in their intended backgrounds performed better 
than UCP—confirming the Army’s intent to replace UCP. All the vendors patterns performed 
similarly in their intended backgrounds—this “tight shot” group gave the Army many options 
and confirmed that overall pattern colors and brightness was much more important than 
pattern design when assessment concealment effectiveness.  
 In May 2013, Army senior leaders approved the expanded use of OEF CP to replace UCP 
across the Army and the purchase of the non-exclusive government license rights to one of the 
competing vendors’ patterns (the Crye transitional pattern that was very similar and visually 
indistinguishable from OEF CP) offered as an option in the Phase IV contract. Because all of the 
vendor patterns performed similarly in testing, the Army based its decision on other 
considerations, primarily affordability—the Army could leverage existing inventories of OEF CP 
OCIE and reduce the overall implementation costs to the Army. However, the Army delayed the 
announcement of the decision. Army senior leaders were hesitant to announce a uniform 
change decision during a time of intense budget pressure and with the threat of sequestration 
looming. More importantly, Congress released the draft fiscal year (FY) 2014 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA), and it potentially limited the Army’s camouflage flexibility by 
prohibiting any new camouflage patterns unless all services adopted the new pattern. At the 
time, it was unclear whether the camouflage patterns tested in the Phase IV effort would 
violate the NDAA restrictions. 
 In August 2013, to avoid the threat of protests by Phase IV vendors and subsequent 
lengthy contractual challenges and to avoid potential violations of the new statutory 
restrictions in the pending NDAA, the Army changed its contracting strategy to pursue a sole-
source contract for the non-exclusive license rights (i.e., government purpose rights) to OEF CP 
and to delay exercising any remaining Phase IV contract options until the FY14 NDAA language 






be similar to the price offered to the Army for the transitional pattern non-exclusive license 
rights in the Phase IV contract. 
 In October 2013, Crye Precision LLC balked at the terms of the contract proposed by the 
Army for OEF CP. The contract terms for the non-exclusive license rights were identical to the 
Phase IV contract option terms. Crye Precision LLC wanted considerably more money for OEF 






Exhibit 2. Camouflage Testing Basics 
Two different criteria existed to compare the effectiveness of camouflage: detection 
and blending. Camouflage testing determined detection and blending scores for various 
camouflage patterns in relevant military operating environments. Detection is the ability to pick 
out the camouflage pattern measured at different distances, and blending is how well the 
camouflage pattern matches the background once detected at a specific range. Photo 
simulation evaluations allowed for collection of significant data in many backgrounds and 
controlled variables (such as distance, movement, background, and brightness) so the 
difference in detection and blending scores could be attributable to different camouflage 
patterns. The word “simulation” referred to the fact that the technique simulated Soldiers 
being outside at the various sites by looking at computers screens of photos of Soldiers in 
camouflage uniforms. Camouflage pattern selection criteria was based on both detection 
scores (at ranges to 450 meters during the day and to 250 meters at night) and blending scores 
(at 50 meters during the day and at 25 meters during the night).  (Refer to Figure 9.)  
 
Figure 9. Camouflage Pattern Testing Criteria  
Camouflage pattern testing used a combination of field trials and photo simulation 
evaluations. The field trials included day and night testing, and individual soldier 
detection/acquisition at varying distances and varying soldier positions (prone, kneeling, and 
standing). The soldier photo simulation evaluations included feedback from soldiers who 






individuals in various backgrounds. Photo simulation evaluations allow for collection of 






Exhibit 3.  A Basic Overview of Army Combat Camouflage Uniforms 
 After basic initial entry training, the Army issued soldiers uniforms and other essential 
combat equipment, classified as organization clothing and individual equipment (OCIE) and 
generally referred to as the soldier’s clothing bag. Part of this issue to soldiers was the Army 
combat uniform (ACU). The ACU was the uniform that soldiers wore in daily garrison operations 
when not deployed to combat operations. The ACU fabric was a 50-50 mix of cotton and nylon, 
and came with the universal camouflage pattern (UCP), selling in the Military Clothing Store for 
about $90 for a coat and trouser set. After they wore out, soldiers used their clothing 
replacement allowance to buy new sets of uniforms. Examples of OCIE included the seven-layer 
Generation III Extended Cold Weather Clothing System (ECWCS), the field pack or rucksack (part 
of the modular lightweight load-carrying equipment [MOLLE]), and the ballistic vests (part of 
the improved outer tactical vests [IOTV])—all issued with the UCP. 
 
 Beginning in mid-2005, the Army recognized the importance of protecting soldiers from 
battlefield hazards and included specific uniform requirements for protection against insects 
(resulting in permethrin treatment) and fire or flame (resulting in flame-resistant fabrics). 
When Soldiers deployed to combat, the Army issued soldiers the Flame Resistant Army Combat 
Uniform (FRACU) with the UCP. The FRACU was made of 65% rayon, 25% para-aramid, and 10% 
nylon. The price of a FRACU set of coat and trousers averaged about $180. Additionally, Soldiers 
received the Flame Resistant Environment Ensemble (FREE)—the FR version of the ECWCS. 
Soldiers did not normally deploy with the clothing bag-issued ACU and ECWCS—those were for 
daily wear in garrison operations and in training. In 2011, the Army issued soldiers deploying to 
Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) the FRACUs and OCIE with the OEF 
Camouflage Pattern (OEF CP).  
 
 The Army remained very cognizant of the value of the combat uniforms and OCIE worn 
by Soldiers and in the inventory. For example, based on the number of active, reserve, and 
National Guard soldiers both non-deployed and deployed, the ACUs worn by Soldiers in their 
clothing bag valued about $131 million and turned over every year. The value of OCIE worn by 
soldiers or in inventory with UCP totaled about $3.5 billion and turned over every 5–10 years 
depending on the durability of the items. Deploying soldiers to Iraq and Kuwait had another 
$170 million worth of UCP uniforms and OCIE. Uniforms and OCIE with the UCP totaled over 
$3.8 billion in value (see Figure 10). To support soldiers deploying to Afghanistan, the Army 
maintained uniforms and OCIE with the OEF CP with a value of about $1.4 billion. Based on the 
average monthly demand, the Army spent approximately $39 million per month sustaining UCP 
uniforms and OCIE from the Army base operations and maintenance budget for an Army of 















Exhibit 4. U.S. Defense Acquisition Institution—Decision Framework 
Within the DOD, the development, testing, procurement, and fielding of capability for 
the warfighter operates within a decision-making framework that is complex. Within the private 
sector, similar frameworks exist. The U.S. defense acquisition institution has three fundamental 
support templates that provide requirements, funding, and management constraints. The 
executive branch, Congress, and industry work together to deliver capability with the program 
manager (PM) as the central person responsible for cost, schedule, and performance. Figure 11 
depicts this framework. 
 
Figure 11. Defense Acquisition Institution 
The government PM is at the center of defense acquisition, which aims to deliver 
warfighter capability. The PM is responsible for cost, schedule, and performance (commonly 
referred to as the “triple constraint”) of assigned projects—usually combat systems within the 
DOD. The executive branch of government provides the PM a formal chain of command in the 
DOD. The PM typically reports directly to a program executive officer, who reports to the 
service acquisition executive (an assistant secretary for that service—either Army, Navy, or Air 
Force), who reports to the defense acquisition executive (the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). Depending on the program’s visibility, importance, 
and/or funding levels, the program decision authority is assigned to the appropriate level of the 






Programs within defense acquisition require resources (for funding) and contracts (for 
execution of work) with industry. Congress provides the resources for the defense programs 
through the annual enactment of the Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts, which 
become law and statutory requirements. The PM, through warranted contracting officers 
governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation, enters contracts with private companies within 
the defense industry. Other important stakeholders include actual warfighters, the American 
public, the media, and functional experts (like engineers, testers, logisticians, cost estimators, 
etc.), as well as fiscal and regulatory lawyers.  
As a backdrop to this complicated organizational structure for defense PMs, there are 
three decision support templates: one for the generation of requirements, a second for the 
management of program milestones and, and a third for the allocation of resources. Each of 
these decision support systems is fundamentally driven by different and often contradictory 
factors. The requirement generation system is driven primarily by a combination of capability 
needs and an adaptive, evolving threat. The resource allocation system is calendar-driven by 
Congress writing an appropriation bill—providing control of funding to the Congress and 
transparency to the American public and media for taxpayer money. The defense acquisition 
management system is event-driven by milestones based on commercial industry best practices 
of knowledge points and off-ramps supported by the design, development, and testing of the 
systems as technology matures.  
